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the increasing integration of world economies, which organize in complex multilayer networks of 
interactions, is one of the critical factors for the global propagation of economic crises. We adopt the 
network science approach to quantify shock propagation on the global trade-investment multiplex 
network. to this aim, we propose a model that couples a spreading dynamics, describing how economic 
distress propagates between connected countries, with an internal contagion mechanism, describing 
the spreading of such economic distress within a given country. At the local level, we find that the 
interplay between trade and financial interactions influences the vulnerabilities of countries to shocks. 
At the large scale, we find a simple linear relation between the relative magnitude of a shock in a 
country and its global impact on the whole economic system, albeit the strength of internal contagion 
is country-dependent and the inter-country propagation dynamics is non-linear. interestingly, this 
systemic impact can be associated to intra-layer and inter-layer scale factors that we name network 
multipliers, that are independent of the magnitude of the initial shock. our model sets-up a quantitative 
framework to stress-test the robustness of individual countries and of the world economy.
The integrated nature of the world economy is the ultimate cause for the propagation of economic crisis at a global 
scale1. A shock originated in a country may spread to its economic partners through multiple channels, captured 
by the balance of payments2,3. Shocks can have different origins, e.g. financial shocks can be caused by defaults 
of big financial institutions or sovereign debt crisis, while trade shocks may be triggered by barriers raised by 
governments, such as protective tariffs. The increasing global interconnectedness of world economies4 calls for a 
modeling framework of shock propagation able to incorporate the full complexity of these interactions5–7.
Network science8 provides useful tools to quantify, model, and predict the behavior of spreading phenom-
ena in complex systems, from information diffusion over social networks to epidemics in living systems9,10. The 
study of international trade networks, in particular, has a long tradition in network science11–18. Network effects 
have been showed to substantially affect the spreading of economic crises19–21, while network tools are being 
increasingly employed to estimate systemic risk among financial institutions22–28 and to evaluate financial con-
tagion over networks of banks29–32. Most of these works assess financial stability by considering the failure of 
single institutions (e.g., banks) and specific propagation channels (e.g. interbank lending), and only a few works 
considered global networks at the country level33,34 and addressed shock propagation over financial cross-border 
networks35–37.
Since international shocks spread through both trade and financial channels, neglecting the interplay between 
them may lead to underestimate spillover effects. In this paper, we address global shock propagation by tak-
ing into account both trade and financial international relations, represented as a multiplex network38. The 
trade-investment multiplex is reconstructed using yearly data of bilateral trade and financial positions between 
countries, coupled to a dynamics describing how economic distress is transmitted from one country to another. 
Our model allows us to estimate both the vulnerability of a country to external shocks, and the systemic impact 
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that a country poses to the whole economic system. Remarkably, we find that spillover effects due to the intercon-
nectedness of trade and financial economic relations can be encoded into networks multipliers.
the trade-investment Multiplex network
Trade and investment interactions between countries in the world can be represented in two different layers of a 
multiplex network, the global trade-investment (GTI) network. Multi-layered networks provide a proper theoret-
ical framework to address contagion phenomena involving different propagation channels, whose interplay can-
not be captured by single-layered networks39,40. In the GTI multiplex network, countries are represented as nodes 
and weighted links represent the existence and intensity of trade or financial connections between countries, and 
are separated in two different layers, one for each type of economic interaction. In the trade (T) layer, the amount 
of goods exported from country i to country j can be taken as a proxy for the bilateral vulnerability of i with 
respect to a shock originated in j: the more country i exports to country j, the more country i will be affected by a 
demand drop in country j. We reconstruct the T layer by means of bilateral trade data of goods exchanges, by 
using the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database41 (analyzed for the first time as a complex net-
work in11), as detailed in the Methods section. A directed link from country i to country j in layer T represents the 
exports of goods from i to j, xij, in a given year, which is equivalent to the imports of goods of j from i, ≡m xji ij. 
The total exports of country i are simply X xi j ij= ∑ , and its total imports are M x mi j ji j ij= ∑ = ∑ . Transactions 
in goods account for the majority (generally over 70%) of the current account of a country, and thus they can be 
considered as a good proxy of the strength of its trading interactions, see Supplementary Material (SM) for details.
In the investment (I) layer, the bilateral vulnerability of a country i with respect to a shock originated in a 
country j can be accounted for by the financial dependence of i on j: the more i relies on j’s investments to finance 
its economy, the more country i will be directly affected by a shock originating in country j. Here, we consider 
cross-border positions of portfolio securities between two countries, reported in ref. 42, as a proxy of the strength 
of their financial bilateral exposure, see Methods and SM. The I layer is thus reconstructed such that a link 
directed from node i to node j represents the stock of portfolio assets owned by country i and issued by country j 
in a given year, aij, equivalent to a portfolio liability for j to i, ≡l aji ij. The total stock of portfolio assets owned by 
i in a given year is simply = ∑A ai j ij, and its total portfolio liabilities reads L a li j ji j ij= ∑ = ∑ . Note that while 
the T layer is formed by trade flows, links in the I layer represent stock quantities. Finally, note that the following 
trivial relations hold









where WT stands for the annual total value of traded goods, and WI for the annual total value of investment 
positions.
We reconstructed GTI multiplex networks for each year between 2001 and 2008. Notice that bilateral data 
disclosing international financial exposures are scarce and affected by important biases, like those introduced by 
the effects of offshore tax heavens, which could greatly affect the reliability of the results. Therefore, we decided to 
consider the high-quality data sets available in42 (stopping in 2008 right before the last crisis), which completed 
financial data collected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), see Methods and SM. In the rest of the paper, 
we consider the GTI network corresponding to the year 2005 (whose topological properties are described in SM) 
as an illustrative case, results for other years are similar.
the Shock propagation Model
A shock in an epicenter country may be driven by different domestic or exogenous factors, such as political insta-
bility, fiscal contraction, banking crisis, etc. Here, we assume that shocks cause a drop on aggregate demand43. 
This implies that the epicenter country may reduce its imports from other countries and/or its investment in 
financial assets issued by other countries. An initial shock in a country i can be fully characterized by two param-
eters α and β, representing the initial variations in imports and foreign assets investment, Miδ α=  and Aiδ β= , 
respectively. The notation δYi stands for the relative variation of the quantity Yi, where =Y X M A L{ , , , }i i i i i . With 
this notation, an epicenter country i that reduces its import by 10% and investment by 20% is characterized by 
α = − .0 1 and 0 2β = − . . The distress is subsequently distributed from country i to its partners, proportionally to 
the intensities of the corresponding economic interactions. This implies negative variations in the exports and 
liabilities –δXj and δLj– of impacted neighbors j. On their turn, these variations may produce variations in 
imports, δMj, and assets acquisition, δAj, of each country j, that will be again distributed proportionally to their 
neighbors in the GTI multiplex network, and so on. Therefore, the model’s behavior is defined by a coexistence of 
two coupled but different dynamics: i) the external propagation of the shock from distressed to connected coun-
tries, and ii) the internal contagion of the shock within distressed countries.
The inter-country contagion runs on top of GTI multiplex network and accounts properly for reverberation 
and second-order effects. Akin to general spreading models in network science10, each country is classified in 
three mutually exclusive states: vulnerable to receive the shock for the first time, active if it has accumulated dis-
tress and is able to propagate it, or inactive when it can receive distress from its partners but cannot propagate 
it anymore. Initially, all countries are in the vulnerable state, except for the epicenter country, which is active. 
Active nodes spread their distress to all neighbors (regardless of their status) as described in the previous para-
graph, and turn inactive immediately after. Vulnerable countries reached by the propagation become active. The 
shock propagation continues until all active countries have spread their accumulated distress, and the active state 
disappears from the system. Then, the contagion dynamics is repeated several times, each time setting as initial 
variations the distress accumulated by inactive nodes in the last round, until the system reaches a final steady state 
(see SM for a concrete example). Therefore, each step of the contagion corresponds to a time interval obtained by 
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dividing the total duration of the shock propagation dynamics, assumed to be one year, by the number of conta-
gion steps, =n 50, that ensures that the system has reached a steady state. See SM and Fig. S3 for details.
The internal contagion of the shock within distressed countries can be modeled by relating the variation of 
imports and assets acquisition of a country to the variation in its exports and liabilities incurrence in the short 
term, such as M f X L( , )t i iδ δ δ=  and δ δ δ=A f X L( , )t i i . By considering balance of payments constraints, indeed, 
the capacity of a country to pay for its import and to acquire foreign assets may depend on its ability to generate 
sufficient revenues from exports and financial liabilities. We thus assume that a country’s revenues from exports 
and financial liabilities can be viewed as a budget constraint on its capacity to import and acquire foreign assets44. 
We also assume that the exchange rate and prices do not adjust quickly and we neglect possible policy action 
aimed at counteract the shock effects.
Therefore, the dependency of imports and financial assets on revenues from exports and liabilities can be 
viewed as a simple elasticity relation, and learned from the data. To this aim, for each country we consider a 
multivariate linear regression model representing the correlations between the quantities δXt, δMt, δAt, and δLt. 
The elasticity relations can be described by the following equations (we omit the dependency in the country i for 
brevity):
M c c X c L
A c c X c L , (2)
M MX ML M
A AX AL A
δ δ δ ε
δ δ δ ε
= + + +
= + + +
where cM and cA represent the intercept terms and the coefficients cMX, cAL, cML, and cAX encode the correlations 
between (δX, δL) and (δM, δA), while εM and εA account for Gaussian noise, with zero average 0M Aε ε〈 〉 = 〈 〉 =  
and variance ε σ〈 〉 = εM
2 2
M
, ε σ〈 〉 = εA
2 2
A
. It is worth to note that Eq. (2) incorporates the mechanical accounting con-
straint linking trade deficit/surplus with variations in part of the financial account (portfolio investments). 
Coefficients cMX, cML, cAX, and cAL thus play the role of internal pass-through coefficients, since they describe how 
the variations of imports and asset of a country depend on the variations of its exports and liabilities. It is impor-
tant to remark that (i) Eqs. (2) are treated as simultaneous equations, by incorporating the possible correlations 
between all variables, (ii) the statistical significance of pass-through coefficients is implicitly encoded in the vari-






), the larger the noise, the less significant the associated coefficient. See Methods and 
SM for further details. Countries with internal pass-through coefficients smaller/larger than one will reduce/
increase the impact of the shock to their commercial or financial partners, acting thus as absorbers/amplifiers. For 
instance, oil exporters play the role of shock blocker, having small internal pass-through coefficients. See Methods 
and SM for a detailed description of internal pass-through coefficients and their estimation.
Systemic Vulnerability of countries to propagating Shocks
The shock propagation model allows us to assess the impact of demand shocks in one or more countries on the 
rest of the world, when the shock spreads from one country to another through international macroeconomics 
networks like the GTI multiplex. The impact on a country i produced by a shock originated in an epicenter coun-
try E, with parameters (α,β), can be quantified by considering the relative variations Y E( , , )i α β∆  of each macro-
economic variable of country i, Y X M A L{ , , , }i i i i i= , measured at the end of the system’s evolution (once the 
shock has been totally absorbed by the entire system) Yi
F, with respect to its initial value Yi
I, that is,
V Y E Y E Y Y
Y








Iα β α β| ≡ ∆ =
−
.
The quantity α β|V Y E( , , )i  gives a measure of the vulnerability of country i to a shock originated in country E. 
This magnitude can be very heterogeneous across different countries and, even for the nearest neighbors of the 
epicenter country E, it incorporates systemic effects beyond direct bilateral economic interactions. By running 
several numerical simulations of the model with the same initial conditions (α, β, E), one can obtain probability 
distributions for the quantities V Y E( , , )i α β| , and consequently the average 〈Vi(Y|α, β, E)〉 and value at risk 
VaR V Y E[ ( , , )]i α β| , as measures of the expected variability and the risk of loss.
Figure 1 shows the heterogeneity of the vulnerability α β|V Y E( , , )i  across the world, for a shock characterized 
by parameters ( 0 1, 0 4)α β= − . = − .  (different values are tested in the rest of the paper and the SM) and three 
different epicenter countries: the United States, China, and the Eurozone (EZ). We plot both the impacts on trade 
and investment, by coloring countries according to their VaR of exports, | − . − .VaR V X E[ ( 0 1, 0 4, )]i  (left plots), 
and incurrence in liabilities, VaR V L E[ ( 0 1, 0 4, )]i | − . − .  (right plots). One can see that American countries are 
more vulnerable to a shock originated in the United States (first row), with respect to both trade (the exports of 
Mexico, Canada and other South American countries may drop more than 25%) and investment. Shocks in China 
(second row) have a considerable lower impact on the rest of the world, especially with respect to investments. 
Australia, some African and South American countries may be forced to reduce their exports (probably raw 
materials) up to 20%, while the United States shows one of the largest reduction of foreign investment, around 
10%. The economic impact on trade of a shock involving all Eurozone countries (third row) is homogeneously 
distributed to the rest of the world, with a general reduction of exports around 30%, while the financial impact is 
much more heterogeneous: most vulnerable countries are Southern European countries, forced to reduce their 
liabilities by more than 40%, probably due to sovereign debt exposures. The average vulnerabilities 
V X E( 0 1, 0 4, )i〈 | − . − . 〉 and V L E( 0 1, 0 4, )i〈 | − . − . 〉 show qualitatively similar behaviors, see SM. The model can 
thus be used to rank the vulnerabilities of different countries with respect to economic shocks, depending on its 
epicenter and magnitude.
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Quantifying Systemic impact of epicenter countries
Beyond country vulnerabilities, our model allows us to measure the potential risk that each country poses for the 
international economic system as a whole. The global impact of a shock in a given country across the GTI multi-
plex can be quantified by defining its systemic impact ( , )i α β , as the total economic value that is affected by a 
shock originated in country i with parameters (α, β). The systemic impact is expected to depend crucially on the 
propagation of the shock from financial to trade layer, and vice versa. These spillover effects between layers can be 
addressed by considering separately the impacts on trade and investment. One can define the systemic impact on 
trade,  α β( , )i
T , and investment α β( , )i
I , as the affected value of traded goods and financial securities expressed 
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Note that the second equality holds because of Eq. (1).
Figure 2 shows the systemic impact on trade, ( , )i
T α β , and investment, α β( , )i
I , of a shock originated only 
in the financial layer (α = 0, Fig. 2a), or trade layer (β = 0, Fig. 2b) of the GTI multiplex networks, with the United 
States as epicenter country. As expected, the larger the initial distress, represented by parameters (α, β), the larger 
the systemic impact on the rest of the world. Even if the initial shock only involves one layer, the economic distress 
spreads from the financial to the trade layer, and viceversa. Interestingly, the different magnitudes of systemic 
impact reported in Fig. 2 can be quantitatively explained by our model, as we will see in the next section.
Different countries exhibit different magnitudes of systemic impact on trade or investment, that can be taken 
as a measure of their relevance for the stability of the GTI multiplex network. The systemic impact of a country i, 
indeed, is expected to depend on the economic value of the initial shock i , determined simply as 
M A W W( )/( )i i i T Iα β= + + . Figure 3a shows the systemic impact on trade i
T , and investment i
I , as a func-
tion of the value of the initial shock i, characterized by α β= = − .0 2, for countries belonging to the G20 group. 
Figure 1. Systemic vulnerability of countries with respect to a shock originated in the United States (first row), 
China (second row), and in countries belonging to the EZ (third row). We used 0 4α = − .  and β = − .0 1. 
Colors indicate the VaR of exports, ∆VaR X[ ]i  (left plots), and of incurrence in liabilities, ∆VaR L[ ]i  (right plots).
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Surprisingly, we found that the systemic impacts of these countries on global trade ( = T) or investment ( I = ) 
are well fitted by linear regressions, whose coefficients 

( , )γ α β  represent scale factors for the initial shock. This 
implies that, at least for big economies, the systemic impact of a country i can be described simply as 
S Iα β γ α β( , ) ( , )i i

 , where γ α β( , ) encodes the sensitivity of the GTI network to the shock. The larger the 
coefficients 

( , )γ α β , the larger the shock amplification. Notice that these coefficients depend on the initial shock 
but are country-independent. Even if the elasticity relations (2), determining the internal contagion within coun-
tries, are linear, the pass-through coefficients are quite heterogeneous across countries (see SM), and the 
inter-country propagation phase modeled by the spreading dynamics introduces highly non-linear effects.
Furthermore, it is interesting to consider the regression residuals of different countries. For each country i, one 




α β γ α β α β= − .D I S( , ) ( , ) ( , ) (5)i i i
The trade (financial) deviation i
T ( i
I ) of a country i can be positive, if its systemic impact on trade (invest-
ment) is smaller than the fitted value, or negative, if i
T  ( i
I ) is larger than what expected by considering the mag-
nitude of the initial shock i. Figure 3b shows the trade and financial deviations, i
T  and  i
I, respectively, of the 
systemic impact of each country i belonging to the G20 group. These deviations are affected by both the statistical 
error on the systemic impact and the uncertainty of the fitting function, and thus few countries show statistically 
significant values of D ( , )i α β . However, one can see that countries having a significant, positive deviation on 
trade, generally show a significant, negative deviation on investment, and viceversa. China and Germany, for 
instance, have a larger systemic impact on trade and a smaller impact on investment than expected, while the 
United Kingdom and Japan show a considerably smaller impact on trade and a larger impact on investment. Even 
though α βD ( , )i
  are expected to depend on the magnitude of the initial shock, these countries presenting signif-
icant values of the deviations have qualitatively similar behavior regardless the value of (α, β), as shown in the SM. 
It is worth to note that it is not possible to verify the linear scaling between initial shock and systemic impact, and 
consequently its deviations, for small economies, due to large uncertainties over the impact of these countries.
network Multipliers encode Systemic impact
The value of the coefficients ( , )

γ α β  depends on the parameters (α, β) characterizing the initial shock (see SM). 
One can understand this dependency by considering separately shocks originated only in one layer, investment 
or trade, of the GTI multiplex. Figure 4 shows that, also in the case of a exclusively financial (α = − .0 1, Fig. 4a) 
or exclusively trade ( 0 3β = − . , Fig. 4b) shock, the systemic impacts  i
T and i
I  are well fitted by linear regres-
sions. However, the regression coefficients do not strongly depend on the magnitude of the initial shock, being 
remarkably similar for different values of (α, β), see SM. Therefore, we name the scale factors γ ′→  as intra- and 
inter-layer network multipliers, as they gauge the network effects of shock propagation from layer  to layer ′ on 
GTI networks,
α β γ ′→
′  
( , ) , (6)i iS I
where α= M W/i
T
i T and A W/i
I
i I β= .
Figures 4, S9 and S10 show that a financial shock has an intra-layer network multiplier 1 5 0 1I I γ . ± .→ , and 
a inter-layer network multiplier γ . ± .→ 0 3 0 15I T . As expected, the network multiplier for the systemic impact 
Figure 2. Systemic impact on trade,  α β( , )i
T , and investment,  α β( , )i
I , of a shock originated in the United 
States. Different combinations of values (α,β) are considered: the initial shock can be originated in the trade 
layer (plot (a)), α = 0, β < 0), or trade layer (plot (b)), β = 0, α < 0). Error bars represent the standard error of 
the mean over 100 runs. A financial shock reducing by 40% the foreign assets demand in a single, large country 
such as the United States is expected to reduce the total value of financial securities by 11%, but also the total 
traded goods by 4%.
6Scientific RepoRtS |         (2019) 9:13079  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-49173-2
www.nature.com/scientificreportswww.nature.com/scientificreports/
on the investment layer, γ →I I, is much larger than the one for the trade layer, γ →I T. Conversely, a trade shock 
shows an intra-layer network multiplier of 4 5 0 5T Tγ . ± .→  , and an inter-layer network multiplier of 
γ − . ± .→  0 6 0 3T I . It is interesting to note that the network multiplier giving the systemic impact on trade for a 
trade shock T Tγ →  is much bigger than the network multiplier giving the systemic impact on investment for an 
investment shock γ →I I, meaning that the intra-layer network effects are stronger for trade shocks than for finan-
cial shocks. The network multiplier γ →T I is negative, indicating that trade shocks can produce an increase in the 
incurrence in liabilities, probably to compensate the revenue reduction from exports.
The network multipliers 
 
γ → ′ may be used to infer the systemic impact of a country hurt by a combined or 
single-layer shock, given its relative magnitude in each layer. If we assume that the systemic impact generated by 
an initial shock in both financial and trade layers, characterized by (α, β), is comparable to the sum of the sys-
temic impacts of a trade shock with α, and a financial shock with β, then one can estimate the expected impact as
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Figure 5 shows a comparison between the expected impact on trade (Fig. 5a) and investment (Fig. 5b), as 
derived from Eq. (7), and the systemic impact obtained by numerical simulations, originated by an initial shock 
with α = − .0 3, β = − .0 5. One can see that, by taking into accounts the statistical error on the systemic impact 
and the uncertainty on the network multipliers γ → ′  , expected and numerical impacts are actually very close. 
Thus, Eq. (7) allows us to infer the systemic impact of a country, given the initial shock (see SM for different values 
of α, β), at least for large economies.
Finally, Figs 5 and S11 show clearly that the systemic impact of a country does not only depend on its GDP, 
and may be significantly different for trade or investment. The country with the largest systemic impact on the rest 
of the world is by far the United States, with respect to both trade and investment. However, the next countries 
with the largest impact on investment are the United Kingdom and Japan, while Germany and China have the 
Figure 3. (a) Systemic impact on global trade i
T  and investment i
I , as a function of the magnitude of the 
initial shock  α β= + +M A W W( )/( )i i i T I . (b) Trade (i
T, x-axis) versus financial ( i
I, y-axis) deviations, as 
obtained by plot (a)). The initial shock is characterized by 0 2α β= = − .  (different values in the SM), countries 
belonging to the G20 group are shown. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for i. Regression 
coefficients 

γ  are plotted with 95% CI. Size of dots is proportional to countries’ GDP.
Figure 4. Systemic impact on global trade i
T  and investment i




originated only in the investment (plot (a)), α = 0, β = −0.3) or trade (plot (b)), α = −0.1, β = 0, right) layer, for 
countries belonging to the G20 group. Different values of (α, β) are shown in the SM. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean for i. Regression coefficients γ ′→  are plotted with 95% CI. Size of dots is 
proportional to countries’ GDP.
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next largest impact on trade. Note that China, with the second largest GPD, has an expected impact on global 
investment ten times smaller than the United States.
Discussion
Estimating the global effects of economic crises remains a major challenge that we have to solve to advance in 
their prevention and control. We have proved here that a modeling strategy combining a multilayer network 
approach with inter-country and intra-country contagion dynamics is useful to stress-test the systemic vulner-
ability of individual countries, that can act as absorbers or amplifiers and of the world economy to propagating 
shocks. At the large scale, the simple linear relation between the relative magnitude of a shock in a country and its 
impact on the global system is surprising, since the strength of internal contagion is country-dependent and the 
inter-country propagation dynamics is non-linear. Interestingly, this systemic impact is associated to intra-layer 
and inter-layer network multipliers, that are independent of the magnitude of the initial shock.
It is important to remark that our modeling framework has several well-known limitations. Financial data 
are still scarce for specific economies and often show inconsistency, caused for instance by tax heavens42. The 
missing information should then be estimated at the risk of adding noise coming from the estimation method-
ologies. On the other hand, our stress-test model represents a solid but first step towards a more sophisticated 
quantitative framework. For instance, we did not take into account the possible variation of optimal decision 
rules of economic agents as a response to policy change45 and, in order to minimize the number of assumptions, 
the complexity of the economic structure of a country is neglected. Furthermore, there might be several sources 
of endogeneity in determining internal pass-through coefficients through Eq. (2), such as omitted variables (e.g., 
GPD variation), which may lead to biased estimations of the parameters46.
Nevertheless, our approach aims at overcoming more serious limitations in the current modeling approach 
of global shock propagation, mostly based on threshold models, in which a node’s failure triggers a cascade 
dynamics. Even if the complete collapse of a financial institution has been empirically observed several times, 
the default of one or more countries, implying the complete stop of trade and financial flows, seems a very unre-
alistic assumption. Finally, the linearity assumed in the intra-country phase of the shock propagation (another 
limitation, yet common in standard econometrics) is at least partially compensated by the non-linearity of the 
inter-country phase, originated from the repeated spreading dynamics.
One natural spinoff of our work would be to analyze how the GTI multiplex network topology, intra-layer 
pass-through coefficients, and network multipliers evolve in time to compare pre- and post-crisis scenarios. 
Future work should also be devoted to consider the effects of supply-side shocks, in which the epicenter country 
does not reduce its imports from other countries, but rather it reduces exports to its trading partners, comparing 
this scenario with demand-side shocks addressed in this work. In the long run, we hope that our network-based 
macroeconomic approach to the propagation of shocks could be enriched to contribute to the detection of early 
warning signals, as well as suggesting regulatory strategies to prevent the social, economic, and ecological cost 
of crises.
Methods
Here we describe the empirical data used in the paper, available through motivated request to the authors, and the 
estimation of the internal pass-through coefficients of the shock propagation model.
Figure 5. Expected systemic impact versus systemic impact obtained by numerical simulations on trade (a) and 
investment (b) of each country i belonging to the G20 group, originated by an initial shock with 0 3α = − . , 
β = − .0 5. The size of dots is proportional to their GDP, color proportional to  i
 (red for = T , blue for  = I). 
Uncertainties are represented by grey crosses.
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empirical data. Our work relies on different data sources, described in details in the SM, and summarized 
here. The investment layer of the GTI network is reconstructed by using the bilateral matrix of cross-border 
financial positions between countries, as reported in ref. 42. Bilateral data disclosing financial exposures are scarce. 
However, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) annually conducted by the IMF reports data of 
cross-border positions of portfolio securities between countries. Portfolio securities represent the largest fraction 
of cross-border investment positions, that include also direct investments and banking sector positions37. We 
consider cross-border portfolio investment positions between two countries as a proxy of the strength of their 
financial interactions. While portfolio investments account only for a part of a country’s financial exposures, 
we choose to focus on them for two reasons: i) data regarding portfolio investments are the more complete and 
reliable available, ii) portfolio investments can be considered short term as compared with other financial expo-
sures, e.g. foreign direct investments, and thus are more appropriate to describe shock propagation. Note that, 
since CPIS data are biased because of offshore tax heavens, here we considered the data sets compiled in ref. 42, 
which completed CPIS data, as detailed in the SM. The trade layer of the GTI multiplex network is reconstructed 
by using the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database41, also used and described in ref. 18. The mul-
tivariate regression model, described by Eq. (2), is informed by the time series of exports, imports, incurrence of 
liabilities, and acquisition of assets, as recorded by the IMF. We considered yearly data, from 1980 to 2015. We 
exclude global recession periods from the time series, i.e. years 1982, 1991, and 200947.
Estimation of internal pass-through coefficients. We estimate trend terms, internal pass-through 
coefficients, and noise terms in Eq. (2) for each country by calculating variances and co-variances of the four time 
series {dX, dM, dA, dL}, extracted from annual data recorded by the IMF, as described in SM. Some observations 
are in order. First, the model assumes that there are no lags between exports/liabilities revenues and imports/
assets payments. Second, one can de-trend the relations described by (2) by setting trend terms equal to zero in 
the shock propagation dynamics, = =c c 0A M . Finally, note that correlations between terms dM and dA are 
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